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Self-Deception: What is it to Blame After All?
PATRIZIA PEDRINI
Does self-deception constitute a threat to the distinguishing kind
of rationality human beings enjoy? I propose a compromise
between the deflationary solutions to the alleged puzzles self-
deception has long been taken to give rise to and some virtues of
the competing account -namely, the intentionalist view. In order
to fulfil the task, I argue as to precisely what is left to blame in
self-deception once we have made sense of why intentionalism
fails to capture the nature of the phenomenon.
Keywords: self-deception, belief, irrationality, rationality.
The trick of desire – which avails itself
of any irrelevant scepticism, finding larger
room for itself in all uncertainty about
effects, in every obscurity that looks like the
absence of law.
Who could say that the death of Raffles
had been hastened? Who knew what
would have saved him?
George  Eliot, Middlemarch
1. Introductory overview
A husband believes that his wife is not having an extra-marital affair,
as she has in fact been having, despite the evidence at his disposal could
easily alert him and make him form the belief that she is unfaithful.1 A
skilled oncologist believes that she has not a cancer, despite the fact that
she displays symptoms that she is normally able to judge as diagnostic of
1 This is one of the most cited examples throughout the literature. For a survey of
similar examples, see A. Lazar, Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of
Belief ‘Under the Influence’, «Mind», 108, 1999, pp. 285-90.
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cancer in her patients.2 A mother believes that her son is innocent of a
crime for which he has been convicted after a full confession.3 And again,
a girl believes that she is displeased with a man with whom she is instead
in love and she believes this despite the fact that in the circumstance in
question she does and feels whatever she usually does and feels in front
of a boy she likes.4 A wife methodically attends to the death of his alcoholic
husband by letting him drink excessively, but she now believes that she
did nothing decisive to hasten his death.5
All the cases sketched above are normally taken to be representa-
tive of self-deception. They show people believing propositions which
are not only false,6 but also extremely weakly warranted by the believers’
own lights, given the evidence, or clues of easily accessible evidence,
they themselves cannot - so we judge - have missed or overlooked.
Another clear feature of the propositions they come to believe is the
desirability of their contents. By hypothesis, the believers in question
are sufficiently competent epistemic agents and in many other
circumstances they repeatedly show and have shown to be perfectly
able to seek, evaluate and use similar, relevant evidence to form beliefs
that are justified in light of it. Their epistemic standards are not defective
in any relevant way. That is, their conceptual capacities are integral,
their sensitivity to reasons efficient. Thus, if they really7 falsely believe
what they ended up believing, there must be a reason (or at least some
sort of intelligible cause)8 why their usual epistemic standards, such as
2 The example has been given by A. O. Rorty, The Self-Deceptive Self: Liars,
Layers and Lairs, in Perspectives on Self-Deception, ed. by B.McLaughlin – A. O.
Rorty, University of California Press, Berkeley 1988, pp. 11-28.
3 A similar example can be found in D. H. Sanford, Self-Deception as
Rationalization, in Perspectives on Self-Deception, ed. by B.McLaughlin – A. O. Rorty,
cit., pp. 156-169; similar examples are also discussed in A. Mele, Self-Deception
Unmasked, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2001; and in J. V. Canfield – D.F.
Gustafson, Self-Deception, «Analysis», 23, 1962, pp. 32-36.
4 The example is discussed by S. Gardner, Irrationality and the Philosophy of
Psychoanalysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993, p. 18 and A. Millar,
Understanding People. Normativity and Rationalising Explanation, Clarendon Press,
Oxford 2004, pp. 151-158.
5 The example is in A. W. Wood, Self-Deception and Bad Faith, in Perspectives
on Self-Deception, ed. by B.McLaughlin – A. O. Rorty, cit., pp. 207-227. He draws it
from G. Eliot, Middlemarch, Bantan Books, New York republished in 1985, p. 644
6 The possibility of being self-deceived in believing a proposition which happens
to be true will not be discussed in this essay.
7 They could only be insincere. Deciding whether a believer is only mendacious
or self-deceived is an interesting task, but it will not be tackled here.
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the requirement of total evidence for inductive reasoning,9 are – so it
seems - inoperative or suspended. In general, we need an explanation
as to why similar doxastic outcomes can be brought about – one which
be both sufficiently realistic and informative.
I assume that we as interpreters wish to find out in their overall
psychological predicament one or some internal reasons, that is to say,
reasons they as epistemic agents recognize as such and have employed
in their reasoning towards the doxastic conclusion they reached. This
discovery would be paramount to our understanding of them and to
preserving the minimal rationality we credit each other with, abnormal
cases apart. At the same time, we also expect that these internal reasons
must be somehow defective or distorted as not to count as normative
reasons, if the irrational outcome resulted. It is false that ‘tout compren-
dre est tout pardonner’. A motivating reason can have a causal effect on
our thinking and behaviour and thus be explanatory of that very
thinking and behaviour, and still not be a normative reason to think
and act as we do.10
The thesis hinted at above according to which the usual epistemic
standards are not applied in self-deception is only one of the possible
working hypotheses a theorist may begin with when analysing self-
deception. Part of my attempt will be in fact to vindicate the idea that
self-deception requires far more than a ‘mere’, ‘immediate’, ‘non agential’
suspension of usual epistemic activity; rather, it is my view that self-
deception consists of an intense and often psychologically wearing
epistemic activity. If there is at some point of the self-deceptive process a
suspension of them at all, this must nonetheless be sustained by a host of
‘justifying reasons’ that help the self-deceivers wrongly believe that
‘normal standards are not to be applied in the situation they are involved
in’. This is the ‘crucial’ self-deceptive belief, more than the false belief
they come to acquire. For self-deceivers’ rationality requires that they
give themselves an answer to the question as to why the correct doxastic
conclusion ‘cannot’ be achieved in the specific case they confront. This
distinguishes self-deception from other more immediate forms of
motivated irrationality, as we will see. The self-deceiver’s constraints over
8 See D. Davidson, Incoherence and Irrationality, in «Dialectica», 39 (4), 1985, pp.
345-354. The argument is that by a priori assuming the rationality of human beings, we
naturally look for rationalizing explanations of their behaviour.
9 See Id., Deception and Division, in The Multiple Self, ed. by J. Elster, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1986, p.81.
10 In general, to say that one action of belief is rationalized by a series of considerations
does not equal to say that the action or the belief are rational.
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the sufficiency of this ‘covering beliefs’ concerning their epistemic
judgments themselves may be more or less demanding, more or less
articulated, depending on the conceptual sophistication, the actual
circumstances and the rationalising satisfaction threshold of the believer.
When explaining self-deception, we must be prepared to allow for the
possibility of its occurring in different degrees. In any case, if there is no
justifying reason about the suitability of the suspension of the usual
epistemic standards we may well be in front of a form a motivated
irrationality, though not yet in front of an instance of full-blown self-
deception.
Contrary to many positions in the literature, I take this very
epistemic endeavour that we call self-deception to be largely conscious.
Self-deception is paradigmatically achieved by means of a tentacular
web of rationalizing covering stories to which the self-deceiver carefully
and obstinately commits his reasoning activity. Otherwise, again, it
deserves the name of some other less specific, though common and
real, motivated irrationality. Many of the above examples can be hard-
pressed enough to show that the self-deceiver’s participation to his self-
deception is active and that self-deception is not entirely accomplished,
so to say, ‘behind one’s back’, nor is it achieved solely – as I will say -
through the effect of motivation over cognition.
Still, it is true that in self-deception ‘something’ escaped the self-
deceiver’s control. Among those who go for an ‘active’ characterization of
self-deception, it is typically maintained that self-deception must involve
some sort of unawareness: some have argued for the unawareness of the
belief that would be correct to form and that self-deceivers indeed have
formed, being the formation of it just the triggering cause of the self-
deceptive process’ starting-up.11 Others have argued for the unawareness
of the entire process.12 How to explain it may involve deploying a number
of both static and dynamic hypotheses, respectively both on the architecture
and the working of the mind. Their rationale in the theoretical economy
of these theories and how my account departs from them will be clarified
in section 2 and later in section 4 and 5.
11 D. Davidson, Paradoxes of Irrationality, in Philosophical Essays on Freud, ed. by
R. Wollheim – J. Hopkins, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, pp. 289-305;
Id., Deception and Division, cit.; K. Bach, Thinking and Believing in Self-Deception,
«Behavioural and Brain Sciences», 20, 1997, pp. 105- ; S. Freud, Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by J. Strachey et al.,
Hogarth Press, London 1953-1974: - (1915), «Repression», S.E. 14; - (1923) «The Ego
and the Id», S.E. 19; - (1938), «Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence», S.E. 23.
12 W. J. Talbott, Intentional Self-Deception in a Single Coherent Self, «Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research», 55, 1995, pp. 27-74.
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On my view, instead, the failure of self-knowledge that self-deception
involves, which is distinctive of it and on which self-deception essentially
runs, does not lie either in the unconscious character of the starting
cognitive state (ranging from a mere suspect to a belief) or in the
unawareness of the whole cognitive process - as it happens in cases of
mere motivationally biased beliefs - but elsewhere. It is this failure that I
take to be what we blame in self-deception; indeed, what the self-deceiver
himself will blame later, when he comes to realize to have undertaken a
self-deceptive reasoning.13 As already mentioned, I will count on a
distinction between self-deception and motivationally biased beliefs: self-
deception appears as a sub-set of the latter, major class. The distinction
will be central in order to clarify that self-deception is best understood
as a process,14 and that, if successful, it generates motivationally biased
beliefs whose irrational status is on a par with those produced by means
of other biased psychological processes triggered by a motivation, such
as fanaticism, partiality and ‘hot’ biases15 in general, while the kind of
process which leads the believer to them makes up for the difference – a
difference reflected by what we specifically blame in either case.
If self-deception is correctly describable as a largely conscious
reasoning process, and in general if there is anything to blame at all in self-
deception, the question as to whether the self-deceivers are the ‘victims’ or
the ‘authors’ of self-deception becomes more pressing. Depending on the
answer, we get an insight into the conception of human rationality and
cognition we are willing to subscribe to. The polemic field contending the
correct theory of self-deception thus far has been divided into two main
groups: ‘intentionalists’ (or ‘traditionalists’) and ‘anti-intentionalists’ (or
‘deflationists’). Intentionalists deem self-deception to be a psychological
process which takes place by means of the intentional activity of the believer
which ends up in a doxastic state toward which the believer had extremely
good reasons not to end up: at the very least, the minimal assumption of
an intentionalist is that the self-deceiver plays a decisive role in believing
that p, where p is the self-deceptive proposition, by ‘intentionally leading
himself to get convinced’ of its truth in spite of easily accessible or directly
13 Sometimes, self-attributions of self-deception may themselves be part of the self-
deceptive manoeuvre or simply a mistaken diagnosis. On the topic, see D. H. Sanford,
Self-Deception as Rationalization, cit., and H. Fingarette, Self-Deception, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, London 1969.
14 The term ‘self-deception’ is often uncritically used both for the process and for
the final doxastic state. I will try to clarify from time to time whether I refer to the former
or to the latter.
15 A bias is generally called ‘hot’ when accompanied or triggered by an emotional
state of some kind.
152 Patrizia Pedrini
available evidence suggestive of its falsity. There is room for much stronger
claims within the intentionalist field, e.g. that the self-deceiver believes
what he ‘knew’ it was not so; or that the self-deceiver continues to believe
the falsity of the self-deceptive proposition while believing its truth as well
– he still ‘knows’ it; or, even, that the self-deceiver believes its truth ‘just
because’ he never ceases to believe its falsity. In that case, it is assumed that
the self-deceiver «must intend his deception».16 I will explain in section 2
how these further theses are supposed to work and why they have been
advanced.
Anti-intentionalists, on the other hand, deny that such an intention
is either necessary or sufficient, or both, to explain self-deception and
also deny that it is phenomenologically present in the self-deceiver’s
psychology, either consciously or unconsciously. Their denials are of
course shaped by the specific intentionalist claim that their proponents
are mainly willing to reject, but much of this in section 3. In general,
however, a core claim they deny is that a «desire to believe» a certain
proposition p must be consciously held as the ‘reason’ on which the
self-deceiver would intentionally act, instead of as the unintentional
‘cause’ that triggers the process. I will explain in full detail what
deflationists object to intentionalists in section 3.
What briefly introduced up to now already makes us have in sight
the crucial problem the debate generates. It is tightly linked up to human
rationality and it is, roughly, the following: if the intentionalists are
right, human rationality seems to be deeply threatened: as believing
and intending are involved in self-deception, how can we make sense
of the possibility of intentionally leading us to believe what we must at
least suspect it is a clear falsity or a very unlikely truth?17 Given the
strength of this ‘suspect’, isn’t the resulting doxastic state very similar
to, or even identical with, that of a person who entertains a pair of
contradictory beliefs? Moreover, isn’t the project of self-deception, as
intentionalists tend to describe it, self-defeating? That is, how can the
deliberate intention of believing what one doesn’t believe, or it’s
immensely hard to believe, succeed? If one knowingly decides to believe
something, it seems that one cannot, for that very reason, accomplish
one’s decision.
More precisely, the problem is that a belief is by its very nature
truth-oriented and representative of the world. The state of affair the
16 D. Davidson, Deception and Division, cit., p. 87.
17 For an accurate account of ‘believing in the face of evidence’, otherwise known
as ‘incontinent believing’, see A. Mele, Incontinent Believing, «Philosophical Quarterly»,
36 (143), 1986, pp. 212-229. The akin concept of ‘doxastic incontinence’ is discussed in
J. Heil, Doxastic Incontinence, «Mind», XCIII, 1984, pp. 56-70.
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belief content represents determines the doxastic response of the
competent epistemic agent. Evidence the subject faces contains an
element of necessity which is constitutive of believing. The subject is
not, as it were, ‘free’ in believing what the evidence backs up or points
to. If I see that outside it rains, I immediately form the belief that it
rains. Maybe my eyes do not work properly or there might be other,
more or less far-fetched reasons why I should revise that belief. But it
is indisputable that I perform my judgment and I acquire the belief
immediately, no soon as I am presented with the extremely good
evidence I have got when I look out and see that it rains. So, to have
factual beliefs at all is to adhere to this element of necessity: unless one
has not recognized the relevant evidence ‘as’ relevant – which seems to
be extremely hard to happen in the examples presented – or already
has some valid countervailing reasons for judging the evidence
misleading, it seems that one can but immediately form the belief
without further ado. Believing, thus, is not an act of free will18 and to
be a believer at all is to be but incapable to escape the strength of the
evidence once appreciated as such.
 So, let us come back to what is inherently puzzling in having an
intention such as that of bringing it about that one believes a proposi-
tion contrary of what the evidence one possesses justifies. Conceiving
of such an intention is deeply irrational; indeed, one of the most
irrational projects one could ever plan. Not only would it mean to shirk
the concept of belief a rational agent possesses,19 since the belief thus
formed would be responsive to the mere intention to form it, instead
of to the evidence for it; it also means to misapply the concept of
intention or to have, to say the least, a bizarre concept of it, since in
order to have an intention I have to be prepared to take whatever steps
is necessary to fulfil it; but in the case of ‘intending to believe’ the
constitutive intention would intelligibly prescribe nothing else than
intending to form a belief on a certain subject matter - that is to say, to
attend the relevant evidence, which is precisely what from which the
self-deceiver somehow must have deviated. Either one cannot conceive
of any such intention - and self-deception must then be explained, or
explained away, along non-intentionalist lines - or this intention must
be stipulated to be of an unconscious kind, although active in a way
18 An exhaustive set of discussions about the present question are gathered in «The
Monist», 85, 3, 2002. The volume is titled Controlling Beliefs.
19 That in order to have beliefs a creature must possess the concept of belief is
widely discussed by Donald Davidson throughout his work. For wide argumentations in
defence of the thesis, see A. Millar, Understanding People. Normativity and Rationalising
Explanation, cit., chapter 1, 4 and 5.
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that critics who advanced a similar hypothesis have traditionally not an
easy time to clarify.20
Notice that the main problem for intentionalism is ‘just’ the intentional
character of self-deception, more than the possibility of being in an
intractable, self-contradictory state of mind mentioned above.21 The latter
possibility can be more easily dismissed by supposing, for instance, that
the agent simply changed his mind after self-deception had been completed;
or that the process did not get started by a belief, contrary to the ending
one, which is maintained throughout the process and after it has been
over. Equally, other problems it faces and that have been lucidly stressed
in the literature, can be, as we will see, rather easily defused. But as far as
an intention of bringing it about that I believe a proposition in the face of
its supporting evidence is taken as central to self-deception, it still remains
unclear how such an intention could ever succeed. It isn’t certainly enough
to have, either consciously or unconsciously, such a project in order to
accomplish it because, given the remarks made above about the nature of
believing and intending, the remaining explanatory alternative would be
that it be the case that people should count, at some point of their self-
deceptive process, on some peculiar and, so to say, ‘lucky’ psychological
mechanisms, deputed to guarantee the transition from their intention that
p to their belief that p, for the project to be completed. The intention
alone cannot make for its fulfilment.22 The likely verdict will well be that
nothing like self-deception can ever possibly exist.
20 Sartre has famously criticised Freudian repression by pointing out that if the
censor is in charge of pushing the painful belief out of consciousness, we have to suppo-
se that the censor knows that he is bringing about the deception. Then, another censorial
item must be posited, which would be in charge of removing from the censor the awareness
that it is working to deceive the conscience. See J.P. Sartre L’être et le néant, Gallimard,
Paris 1943, trans. Being and Nothingness, Hazel Barnes, Pocket Books, New York, chapter
2. The threat of the regress undermines the theory of unconscious intention. Others
critical remarks on the idea are in J. Heil, Doxastic Incontinence, cit.; A. Bird, Rationality
and the Structure of Self-Deception, «European Review of Philosophy», 1, 1994, pp. 19-
38; and A. Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked, cit., chapters 2 and 3.
21  That the intentional character of self-deception would be the major threat to a non
paradoxical account of it is maintained also by H. Fingarette, Self-Deception, cit., ch.2.
22  One counterexample to the present claim would be that of a boy who manages
to deceive his future self by recording on his diary a wrong date for a meeting. He counts
on the circumstance that he will certainly forget that he entered the wrong date. That
way, he is sure that he will acquire a false belief when he will read that page of his diary.
But we might resist to count the case as paradigmatic of self-deception, for the most
interesting case of self-deception is one achieved via epistemic reflection over one’s present
predicament and one that do not rest on devices like weak memory ot time to succeed.
The example is presented by B. McLaughlin, Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception,
in Perspectives on Self-Deception, ed. by B. McLaughlin – A. O. Rorty, cit., pp. 29-62.
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Anti-intentionalists have a straightforward answer to the latter
problem. It has long been rightly considered a virtue of their accounts to
have shown that the intentionalist analysis is flawed by its imposing a
paradoxical intention on a process that can be instead non-paradoxically
accounted for without appealing to that very intention. On the anti-
intentionalist view, the self-deceptive process would not consist of an
impossible transition from the intention to believe that p to the belief
that p; rather the process is initiated by a desire that p which leads, in
ways to be specified, to the self-deceptive belief that p. Although not
triggered by any deliberate intention of deceiving oneself,23 the human
cognitive machinery is shown to contain purpose-serving belief-forming
regularities that, pace the intentionalists, aren’t (and needn’t) be activated
by any intentionally self-deceiving process at all. Roughly, having a desire
that p, even though p is not sufficiently warranted, may, in many cases,
do the job and bias our reasoning so as to lead us to form irrational
beliefs. Empirical studies have been largely invoked to support the claim
and to do justice to the implausibility of an analysis of self-deception
carried out only by means of conceptual investigation.
I will explore in more detail in section 3 some representative anti-
intentionalist responses. It will serve my argumentative purpose to show
that, although the anti-intentionalists correctly fix the explanatory limits
of the stronger intentionalist positions, to all appearances, they in fact
have to bank (and indeed several do so, what they claim notwithstanding)
on a minimal intentionalist element in order to work. Otherwise, the
anti-intentionalist account stands on pain of:
1) not differentiating sufficiently between human and animal
psychology, so as to end up including certain animal appetite-behaviour
patterns among the range of self-deceptive phenomena, whilst self-
deception can be appropriately ascribed only to creatures who are self-
understanders and self-explainers;
2) giving an incorrect account of the alleged ‘sister’ phenomenon of
‘wishful thinking’, or misinterpreting it so as to end up assimilating it to
self-deception;
3) running the risk of being so comprehensive to force us to incor-
porate, among the cases of alleged self-deception, also cases of
motivational biased cognition not mediated by any reasoning at all, which
23 At least one example of how one could intentionally acquire a belief on a
proposition he now disbelieves is exemplified by the so called Pascal’s wager, where an
agnostic willingly decides to act as if God existed in order o acquire over time the belief
that God exists. I will not try to analyse what a similar case, if successful, would amount
to. The case is distant from the ones I have in mind for reasons akin to those expressed in
the previous footnote.
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we might resist identifying as self-deception (e.g., partiality, fanaticism,
immediate emotional responses, «precipitate cases»24 of motivated
believing, etc.);
4) rendering self-deception a passive phenomenon, unanswerable
in any relevant sense.
At the same time, I take it that the anti-intentionalist account contains
the clues for acceptably completing the picture: anti-intentionalist
accounts tend in fact to stress, though in a different fashion from the one
I favour and in view of different results, a characteristic failure of self-
knowledge that becomes the proper object of regret the ex self-deceiver
himself indicates as crucial in his having been just the ‘author’ of his self-
deception - an author, we may concede, with some extenuating
circumstances. The same failure is what an interpreter correctly appeals
to when faced up with the task of making sense of the self-deceiver’s
predicament. He may even realize that self-deception was highly
predictable, or almost unavoidable, in the specific case, but he can’t help
judging not only that it was among the self-deceiver’s epistemic
possibilities to conduct his epistemic reasoning differently, but also that
it was ‘in principle’ among his capacities to detect the specific failure of
self-knowledge I will describe. It is about these possibilities that blame
applies and it is on the fully legitimate attribution of these capacities that
blame is grounded.
2. Intentionalist accounts of self-deception.
Intentionalism in its traditional version is generally defended by
arguments to the best explanation, which in turn rest on a conceptual25
analysis of the term ‘self-deception’ primarily conducted by looking at
its lexical constituents. What the term immediately suggests is the idea
that self-deception is a kind of deception, perhaps similar in relevant
respects to other-deception, from which it differs by what the prefix ‘self’
would imply. We are invited to follow the line of thought that any
deception worthy of the name is an ‘action intentionally performed’. The
prefix ‘self’ (not unambiguously) would serve both redundantly to specify
that the action in question is self-conducted and that the person against
24 The phrase is taken from D. Scott-Kakures, At ‘Permanent Risk’: Reasoning and
Self-Knowledge in Self-Deception, «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», 3, LXV,
2002, p. 587.
25 Mele distinguishes between lexicalist strategies, example-based strategies and mixed
strategies. Normally, however one presents one’ s examples in order to show how one’s
theory applies to them: that is, one selects the example on the basis of what one already
thinks self-deception is. Compare A. Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked, cit., pp. 5-6.
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whom deception is performed is just the person who has conceived of it.
In contrast with others-deception, where an agent A is the author of the
deception of which an agent B is the victim, in self-deception the author
and the victim will be one and the same person. Self-deception is then
presented as an action, engaged for a reason which provides support to
a special kind of intention: intending to believe a proposition which may
alleviate anxiety or boost the subject’s self-image, that is, believing a falsity
in sight of non-truth-oriented goals. Remind the cases sketched at the
beginning: the rational belief in each (that my wife is unfaithful, that I
have a cancer, that my son is guilty of a crime, etc.) threatens the fulfilment
of these goals. Since the self-deceiver is, by assumption, capable of
detecting the irrationality of the false belief, the view that the irrational
belief is formed intentionally presents the formation of this belief as a
consequence of practical reasoning. Appealing to practical reason is the
best explanation in order to preserve the assumed integrity of the
believer’s theoretical reason: self-deception is an outcome of a project
that is undertaken by the agent in order to fulfil a desire.
The desire in question, however, may at best be viewed as a cause
for the self-deceptive belief. It entirely fails to be a reason for it. Appealing
to practical reason doesn’t explain yet how that can concretely happen.
It needs then to be explained how that can happen. Which non-rational
forces, if any, must be posited to act against one’s best epistemic
judgment?26 Which hypothesis on the architecture of the mind must be
assumed to account for irrational phenomena?
Davidson27 has given a seminal account of self-deception along similar
lines – an account largely held as the traditional one and which is the
standard locus of quotation from intentionalism for its especial directness.
In the context of marking the difference between wishful thinking and
self-deception, on which I will come back later, he claims that while
wishful thinking presents a sequence in which a desire that p produces
the belief that p, self-deception requires «the agent to do something with
the aim of changing his view».28 In addition, not only must the self-
deceived subject bring about his own deception, he also must do so
intentionally. Davidson writes: «[…] it is not self-deception simply to do
something intentionally with the consequence that one is deceived, for
then a person would be self-deceived if he read and believed a false report
26 See J. Heil, Doxastic Incontinence, cit., pp. 65-67. for a distinction between «one’s
best epistemic judgement» and a judgments «all things considered», where not merely
epistemic considerations can be weighed.
27 D. Davidson, Deception and Division, cit.
28 Ivi, p. 87, my emphasis.
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in a newspaper. The self-deceiver must intend the ‘deception’».29 But
how is this supposed to work? Here is Davidson’s elaboration:
A has evidence on the basis of which he believes that p is more apt to be
true than its negation; the thought that p, or the thought that he ought rationally
to believe that p motivates A to act in such a way as to cause himself to believe
the negation of p. […] All that self-deception demands of the action is that the
motive originates in a belief that p is true (or that the evidence makes it more
likely to be true than not), and that the action be done with the intention of
producing a belief in the negation of p. Finally, and it is especially this that
makes self-deception a problem, the state that motivates self-deception and the
state it produces coexist; in the strongest case, the belief that p not only causes
a belief in the negation that p, but also sustains it.30
There is clear textual evidence that Davidson’s view is that the two
contradictory beliefs are both held consciously. Take the example he gives
of Carlos, a guy who has good reason to believe he will not pass the test
for a driving licence (he has failed twice, his instructor, on whom he
trusts, has said discouraging things, and so on). He is aware that his total
evidence31 points to failure. Other things being equal, he thinks it is better
to avoid pain; the believing that he will fail the test his painful; therefore,
it is better to avoid believing he will fail the test. «Since it is a condition
of his problem that he take the test, this means it would be better to
believe he will pass […] His practical reasoning is straightforward».32
But «core cases of self-deception demand that Carlos remain aware that
his evidence favours that he will fail»;33 therefore, «Carlos believes
inconsistent propositions if he believes that he will pass the test and that
he will not pass the test».34
 A set of considerations is in order here fully to clarify what the view,
as it stands, is essentially up to. Firstly, the account thus posed faces the
problem of explaining the occurrence a paradoxical, indeed impossible,
state of mind: a couple of contradictory beliefs are held contemporary
by the same agent within the same awareness’ area. This is the ‘static
paradox’ of self-deception.35 The trouble here is two-folded: how to
29 Ibidem
30 Ivi, pp. 89-9.
31 Compare ivi, p. 81, where he discusses the requirement of total evidence for
inductive reasoning
32 Ivi, p. 89.
33 Ivi, 90.
34 Ivi,. 91.
35 See A. Mele, Real Self-Deception, «Behavioural and Brain Sciences», 20, 1997,
pp. 91-102; Id., Self-Deception Unmasked, cit., ch.3.
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explain the belief in the conjunction of the two contradictory propositions
finally believed and how they can sustain each other, as Davidson claims
at the end of the passage quoted above. If I could consciously believe at
the same time both that p and that not p, I certainly couldn’t fail to
believe also their conjunction; that is, I would believe that (p & not p), a
contradiction.36 To avoid this problem, one might suppose that the two
beliefs may well be inferentially insulated, and this is the solution
Davidson goes for, by proposing the explanatory hypothesis of a certain
kind of ‘partitioning’ of the mind.37 But then it is unclear how the two
beliefs are supposed to interact on each other, if separated. A dilemma
looms large: if they are not inferentially insulated they fail causally to
interact on each other for rational reasons; if instead they are isolated
they could not reciprocally interact for mere causal reasons. Furthermore,
in either way we have at best a description of the state of mind in question,
not an explanation of it. Also, in either way self-deception is explained
away: not only do we loose touch with the agential manoeuvre it is claimed
to consist of, but we also fail to make sense of how it could be achieved
at all, given the dilemmatic situation described.
The second problem of Davidson’s intentionalism is in fact a dynamic
one, the so-called ‘dynamic paradox’ of self-deception.38 We have just
seen that it can’t intelligibly be the belief that not p to trigger the process
which leads to the self-deceptive belief that p. An intentionalist may then
weaken the ‘two-beliefs requirement’ and allow for less strong theses.
For instance, we may suppose that in self-deception a believer gets a
change of mind: he believed that not-p, but then after having negatively
interpreted the evidence at his disposal, gathered new favourable evidence
for the desired proposition, and so on, he is now convinced that p. Still,
intentionalism faces a problem: he intentionally engaged the process for
the ‘reason’ of leading himself to believe that p and so for the ‘reason’ of
changing his mind. He must intend his deception, that is, he knowingly
takes up the project. This time around, he ends up in a consistent state
of mind, but he must know that the final doxastic state has been produced
36 Notice that two propositions, p and q, may be contradictory, while the beliefs
that p and the belief that q may be inferentially insulated, as it happens in a suitably
complicated theory which contains two inconsistent beliefs both believed by a theorist
without him having yet spotted their inconsistency.
37 D. Davidson, Paradoxes of Irrationality, cit., pp. 303-305. Another version of
partitionism is in D. Pears, Motivated Irrationality, Oxford University Press, New York
1984, p. 130. Contrary to Pears, Davidson claims that his partitioning is only metaphorical.
For a critical discussion of this claim, see S. Borge, The Myth of Self-Deception, «Southern
Journal of Philosophy», XLI, 2003, pp. 1-31.
38 A. Mele, Real Self-Deception, cit.; and Id, Self-Deception Unmasked, cit., ch.3.
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by himself. Any such intention, again, renders the process self-defeating.
In other words, the desire to believe that p cannot intelligibly figure
among the ‘reasons’ for the process to be engaged. It may at best figure
among the ‘causes’ for it.
We are back to the cluster of problems we began with when
cataloguing the alleged cases of self-deception: we have a description of
irrationality, of the puzzling breakdown of reason (either theoretical or
practical) it exhibits, still in need of an informative explanation as to
«how it is done». 39
3. The ‘deflationary’ model
Anti-intentionalists generally argue for their position by starting from
the intentionalist account’s intrinsic difficulties seen above. Their position
is held to be ‘deflationary’ if compared with the intentionalist paradoxical
descriptions of self-deception: self-deception exists, they claim, it can be
accounted for in non paradoxical ways, and it has a straightforward
explanation to the extent that we are willing to cart off the ‘intention to
believe’ which intentionalists posit as essential to it.
Here are the four conditions Al Mele, the most influential among
deflationists, indicates as ‘sufficient’, although not jointly necessary, to
self-deception:40
a) the belief that p which S acquires is false;
b) S treats data relevant, or at least seemingly relevant, to the truth
value of p in a motivationally biased way;
c) the biased treatment is a non-deviant cause of S’s acquiring the
belief that p;
d) the body of data possessed at the time provides greater warrant
for not p than for p.41
In particular, it is d) which is not necessary to entering into self-
deception. The importance of d) not being necessary will be stressed
below. Notice that no intention is cited in (a)-(d). Notice also that no
two-beliefs requirement is mentioned as well.
39 A. Lazar, Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Belief ‘Under
the Influence’, cit., p. 277.
40 A. Mele, Real Self-Deception, cit.; Id., Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception, in Self-
Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality, ed. by J.-P. Dupuy, CSLI Publications, Stanford
1998, pp. 37-58; and A. Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked, cit.
41 See Id, 2001, Self-Deception Unmasked, cit., ch.3.
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The basic idea contained in (a)-(d) is that a desire that p be the case
is sufficient to trigger a number of biases affecting our cognitive process
to the result that we can arrive at believing a falsity. Examples of the
motivational biases Mele refers to in spelling out the condition b) are:
selective attention to evidence that self-deceivers actually possess; selective
means of gathering evidence; negative misinterpretation (failing to count
as evidence against p data that we would easily recognize as such, were
we not motivationally biased); positive misinterpretation (counting as
evidence for p data that we would easily recognize as evidence against p,
were we not motivationally biased). Some other biases Mele introduces
are presumably operative also in ‘cold’ instances of irrational believing,
that is to say, when no motivation is at work, as vividness of information,
availability heuristic, confirmation biases.42
As to (c), the desire in question is a non-deviant cause in that it is
‘thematic’: it is just the desire that p be true that leads to the belief that p
via the processes described. The self-deceiver is content-sensitive to the
desire that p and his content-sensitivity is relevantly explanatory of his
self-deception. More complex scenarios can be of course figured out,
where less direct desires are thematically linked to the desire that p be
true or to the belief that p, as for instance in the negative, or ‘twisted’
cases of self-deception, where S comes to believe that p because he feared
that p be true (e.g., a husband unjustifiably believes that is wife is
unfaithful because he fears that she is unfaithful).43
Self-deception is no more than a process involving the above
ingredients, which are normal players of our general psychological life.
Nothing special, exotic or paradoxical, no ad hoc psychological item or
process needs to be evoked in order to make sense of self-deception.
I will direct in a moment my attention to what ‘desiring that p be the
case’ amounts to, whether this desire needs be aware and how it
conceptually differs, if any, from ‘desiring to believe p’. For the time
being, let me present in more detail what the connection is, on Mele’s
view, between the desire that p be the case and the exercise of motivational
biases. Mele embraces44 the model of everyday hypotheses testing
42 Ivi, pp. 28-29.
43 Ivi, chapter 5.: Lazar thinks that twisted, or negative, self-deception creates a
problem to intentionalism, while deflationism would fare better with them. I think that
nothing prevents in principle to explain, on intentionalism, why a feared proposition is
believed. We only need to enrich the case and add a further desire, one deputed to
explain why the proposition is feared. I will not discuss along the paper twisted cases of
self-deception. Compare A. Lazar, Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation
of Belief ‘Under the Influence’, cit., pp. 274-277.
44 A. Mele, Real Self-Deception, cit.; Id., Self-Deception Unmasked, cit., chapter 3.
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developed by Trope and Liberman45 as the empirical demonstration of
how motivation can bias cognition. The story goes as follows: people
have different acceptance/rejection thresholds for hypotheses depending
upon the expected subjective cost to the individual of false acceptance
or false rejection relative to the resources required for acquiring and
processing information. The higher the expected subjective cost of false
acceptance, the higher the threshold for acceptance, and similarly for
rejection. Hypotheses that have a high acceptance threshold will be more
rigorously tested and evaluated, while those which have a low acceptance
threshold will be more quickly embraced. Now, in self-deception the
expected subjective cost associated with the acquired false belief is low.
For example, the husband who falsely believes that is wife is faithful has
different acceptance thresholds for the hypotheses of falsely believing
that is wife is ‘not’ having an affair and for the hypothesis of falsely
believing that she ‘is having’ an affair: he is much happier at falsely
believing the first hypothesis than at falsely believing the second, because
he desires that she is not having an affair. Clearly, then, Mele has it in
mind that S’s desire that p be true results in a motivationally biased
treatment of data by lowering the acceptance threshold and raising the
rejection threshold of the hypothesis that p, thus opening the door to the
biased treatment.
It is worth noticing that the operative notion of this account is that
of ‘hypothesis’, not of ‘belief’, as in Davidson’s account discussed above.
This largely helps clear the ground from the difficulties surrounding the
traditional intentionalist strategy already unpacked. Taking a hypothesis
that p in order to test p’s truth value is akin to the attitude of entertaining
the thought that p, or suspecting that p. Self-deception needn’t begin
from a stable belief that p. Accordingly, if self-deceivers do not believe
that p, but merely suspect that p might be true, they do not engage in a
process which would hopelessly make violence to their doxastic steady
convictions. At most, they may begin with believing that p, but then take
up undermining the unbearable belief and so come to change their mind
by means of the same mechanisms deputed to lowering the acceptance
threshold of the proposition that p. That is, the belief that p is momentarily
revoked and now the hypothesis that p is in place and available to be
tested. It is intelligible that one person under high motivational pressure
can ask herself whether she should go on believing that p. If the self-
deceptive manoeuvre will be successful, she will have changed her mind.
No static paradoxes need occur.
45 Y. Trope – N. Liberman, Social Hypothesis Testing Cognitive and Motivational
Mechanisms, in Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles, ed. by T. E. Higgins – A.
W. Kruglanski, Guilford Press, New York 1996, pp. 120-137.
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But let me focus on the anti-intentionalist core claim, namely the
idea that self-deceivers do not intentionally bring it about that they believe
that p, further to the desire that p. We must be careful, I think, to what
desiring to believe that p can intelligibly mean.
If a hypothesis is at work, and if the agent has any interest at all in
testing its truth conditions, this means that the agent cannot fail
intentionally to test it. We can say, in this sense, that he ‘intends to form
a belief relative to p’. In particular, when motivationally biased by the
desire that p be true, one intends to establish that there is sufficiently
cogent evidence that p is true. That way, one can form the belief that p.
This does not resemble any puzzling process like intending to believe p,
as it were, ‘at will’. Self-deceivers do not make up their mind so as to
‘decide to believe’ that p. In the latter case, we will be facing the intrinsic
difficulties of intending to believe seen in section 2. In the former case,
instead, no such happening needs be encompassed. Deceptive desires46
operate towards the ‘fact that p’, not towards the ‘fact of believing that
p’ (where the former is a fact about the external world, whilst the latter
is a psychological fact about the agent). Self-deceivers normally do not
want to acquire a state of mind for its own sake, but rather the certainty,
or at least a degree of assurance, that p is true. Given the nature of a
hypothesis, then, it seems intelligible that one intentionally proceeds to
test it. One may fail to recognize that one favours the hypothesis that p
over not p (I will come back to this in section 5), but not that one is
working to test the hypothesis. Anyone who has acquaintance with his/
her own or others’ self-deception may recall how the self-deceiver overtly
evaluates his or her hypothesis and how fervently wants to find evidence
for p. I myself find it difficult to think of a clear example of motivationally
biased hypothesis testing which is not intentional in the sense described.
So, although Mele correctly presents his account as anti-intentionalist
(no intention to deceive oneself) if compared with the traditionalist
intentionalist position, he does not do justice, and rightly so, to a minimal
intentionalism of the kind described.
That this be correct, it is also suggested by the fact that others
deflationists, Ariela Lazar in particular,47 recently object to Mele to fail
to be a thorough deflationist. Let us then see how other versions of anti-
intentionalism work and how they fail to give a sufficiently specific
46 See G. Graham, Russell’s Deceptive Desires, «Philosophical Quarterly», 36, 1986,
pp. 223-229; and B. Williams, Deciding to Believe, in Problems of the Self, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1973, pp. 76-98.
47 A. Lazar, Self-Deception and the Desire to Believe, «The Behavioural and Brain
Sciences», 20, 1997, pp. 119-20; and Id, Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the
Formation of belief ‘Under the Influence’, cit.
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account of self-deception. Subsequently, I will say how Mele account
suffers from a flaw of its own, although it is open to a critic to interpret
his account as minimally intentionalist. Since I think that a minimal
intentionalism is what we need to capture the phenomenon of self-
deception, I will need to show that there are reasons, independent of his
minimal intentionalism, which debar Mele’s (a)-(d) conditions from being
- again - sufficiently specific of self-deception. The d) be not necessary
will be crucial to my argument. The entire discussion will eventually set
the stage directly for the final analysis of the view I favour (section 4, 5
and 6), and its corollaries on human rationality, failure of self-knowledge
and blame.
Lazar claims that Mele fails to avoid the problem of «crazy choices»48
affecting intentionalism in the first place and Mele’s (only nominal) anti-
intentionalism, too. Let’s recall, as a paradigmatic example of what Lazar
has in mind, the case - presented at the beginning of this paper - of the
skilled oncologist, call her Ann, who acquires the false belief that she is
healthy despite the evidence suggesting that she is probably not.49 If Ann’s
self-deception is to be explained as driven by the strong desire of leading
a long and healthy life, it is puzzling that some critics end up – as Mele
would do – appealing to the desire to believe that such life is forthcoming.
The puzzlement is generated by the fact that these two goals will clearly
be in conflict: in Ann’s case the fulfilment of the goal to believe that she
will lead a long life is obtained at the expense of satisfying the original
desire, namely, to lead such a life. In other words, the question of whether
the false belief in self-deception is formed by the agent for the ‘reason’ of
wanting to form that belief is crucial and while Mele rejects the view that
the self-deceptive belief is formed because of an intention to form it, he
nonetheless suggests that it is the ‘desire to believe’ that accounts for the
formation of the irrational belief.50 The point is conceptual: if the ‘desire
to believe that p’ is operative in self-deception as a ‘reason’, instead of
being the ‘desire that p be the case’ merely the operative ‘cause’ of the
whole process, we have self-deception reformulated as a paradoxical
practical sequence: self-deceivers’ choice does not make sense by their
own lights, since they can’t fail to be aware that the desire to believe that
48 She presents three objections: ‘negative (or twisted) cases’, ‘how it is done’, and
‘crazy choices’. The second one has already been made clear. The first one is hinted at in
footnote 43.
49 The examples she discusses in the same spirit are experiments by G. A. Quattrone
and A. Tversky, Causal versus Diagnostic Contingencies: On Self-Deception and on the
Voter’s Illusion, «Journal of Personality and Social Psychology», 46, 1984, pp. 237-248;
and D. Davidson’s case of Carlos seen above, in Id., Deception and Division, cit.
50 Compare A. Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked, cit., sec. 4, par. 8 and 10.
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p cannot be an adequate instrumental reason in the service of fulfilling
of the original desire that p. It is Lazar’s view that the desire that p suffices
to trigger self-deception: we needn’t suppose that any such practical,
mediated reasoning is required to self-deception. Rather, it is just the
adoption of such a picture that makes the case against alleged «crazy
choices» in self-deception.
I think that Lazar’s criticism to any such explanation of self-deception
is fundamentally correct, but I doubt that Mele’s minimal intentionalism
entirely matches the feature of that sort of explanation. This is because
on the hypothesis testing model ‘desiring to believe’ is prima facie
suggested to mean – as I have already pointed out – desiring to form a
belief about the hypothesis that p. Unbeknownst to the self-deceiver, the
desire that p be true causally biases his epistemic strategy, as Mele’s
condition b) clarifies. This does not entail, however, that the self-deceiver
intends the self-deceptive belief to be instrumental to fulfil a desire. Ann
has a desire, which may be even consciously held, to be healthy. She then
evaluates if the hypothesis that she is healthy can be taken as sufficiently
justified. She looks for evidence confirming that she is. She interprets
the evidence at her disposal and seeks new one in order to establish that
it is true that she is healthy. The epistemic endeavour she undertakes is
not ‘so crazy’ after all; certainly it isn’t crazy in the sense described by
Lazar. Granted, Ann intends to form a belief about p; she does this in a
motivationally biased way; but at no point of the testing process described
by Mele she believes that it is better for her to believe that p as a means
to satisfy the desire that p be true. However, I concede that the question
raised by Lazar may still be taken as open. To proceed to a textual
investigation in Mele’s pieces of work will lead me too far. I am in fact in
this essay less interested in adjudicating the present dispute between Mele
and Lazar than I am in explaining why full anti-intentionalism, as Lazar’s
and Johnston’s, fails to capture self-deception as a specific phenomenon
among the wider range of occurrences of motivated irrationality. When
eventually the difficulties of anti-intentionalism will be made clear, Mele’s
failure to be a thorough anti-intentionalist will well be available to be
cashed out in terms of an advantage of his position over other deflationist
accounts.
Now, anti-intentionalists like Lazar and Johnston point to account
for self-deception by deflating not only the role of the traditional intention
to believe a falsity, but more generally the role of reflective reasoning
altogether. They aim at dismissing what they take to be an over-
intellectualist picture of the mind, mainly due to Davidson, affecting the
explanation of self-deception as well as the explanation of belief-formation
under the influence of emotions on the whole. On their views, distortion
of cognition by interest or desire is achieved by means of mechanisms
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that do not encompass rational exercise and conceptual mediation on
the part of the self-deceived believer. By supposing that self-deceivers
do not entertain any second-order belief about what they ought to believe
or to what end, Lazar and Johnston aspire to avoid ‘both’ the problems
of doxastic incontinence (believing in the face of evidence), which
compromises the believers’ theoretical reason, ‘and’ the problem of crazy
choices (believing a falsity as a means of fulfilling a desire that that very
belief in fact frustrates), which compromises the believer’s practical
reason, without substantial explanatory gain in either model.
Here is Johnston:
The sub-intentional mental process involved in wishful thinking and self-
deception is an instance of a non-accidental regularity; anxious desire that p, or
more generally anxiety concerning p, generates the belief that p […]. Hence I
speak of a mental tropism, a characteristic pattern of causation between types
of mental states, a pattern whose existence within the mind is no more surprising,
given what it does for us, than a plant’s turning toward the sun.51
Mental tropisms are, according to Johnston, non-accidental, purpose-
serving mental regularities between types of mental states, e.g., desires
and beliefs, that are not mediated by intentions to act. They are somehow
akin to unreflected habits or reflexes of the mind. In Johnston’s words,
they are «blind but purpose-serving connections»52 between desires and
beliefs. Self-deception is then a process where the desire that p and an
anxiety that not p generates the belief that p, even though the agent has
evidence to the contrary. Such mechanisms are operative in us because
of the vital role they perform: reducing anxiety, which in turn gives us
survival advantages. We certainly have a certain control over our anxiety,
so we have to suppose that the self-deception tropism is activated when
we fail to exert such control.
Ariela Lazar presents an account of self-deception53 in the same spirit
of Johnston’s. The self-deceptive beliefs are, on Lazar’s view, a direct
result or expression of the self-deceiver’s wishes, fears, and hopes. She
calls those beliefs «a kind of fantasy».54 The effects of these emotions
and desires are not mediated by practical reasoning. No negotiations
with the agent’s epistemic standard need to be in place: «Emotions do
51 M. Johnston, Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind, in Perspectives on Self-
Deception, ed. by B. McLaughlin – A. O. Rorty, cit., pp. 66-86.
52 Ivi, p. 88.
53 A. Lazar, Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Belief ‘Under
the Influence’, cit.
54 Ivi, pp. 284-287.
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not affect one’s view of the world through deliberation; they do so
immediately and in a way which, to a high degree, is not subject to our
control».55 […] the formation of emotion-induced (or desire-induces)
beliefs is highly uniform, quick and effortless».56
The trouble with both accounts is that if there is a notion of self-
deception worth having, it must give us more than just being badly
mistaken due to strong emotional affects, anxiety and the like, even if
this is what Lazar thinks self-deception amounts to: «We label self-
deception those beliefs which are at odds with the evidence and which
are highly influenced by the presence of emotions and evaluative
attitudes»,57 and even if Johnston conclude that: «To be self-deceived is
sometimes just to be misled without being intentionally misled or lied to.
The self-deceiver is self-misleader».58
I take that Mele does not seem to deny the role of reasoning
altogether, given that he adheres to the model of hypothesis testing; still,
the trouble with his account is that he denies that reasoning is a necessary
condition to self-deception. Indeed, it is intelligible that one test a
hypothesis blindly, hastily and that the testing operation thus be, or be
next to, a one-step operation which tends to lose the character of a
reflective, though interested, hypothesis testing. If the hypothesis that p
so rapidly is installed as the belief that p, which is entirely possible, we
face a case of motivated irrationality, but not as much clearly as of one of
self-deception. The clue to understand that this be so is clarified by the
circumstance that condition d) in Mele’s set of sufficient conditions (a)-
(d) for self-deception is claimed not to be necessary to self-deception. If
condition d) is not necessary to self-deception, and if self-deception
doesn’t essentially require a reasoned hypothesis testing, the unwelcome
result might well be that an animal could easily be counted as self-
deceived, on a deflationary account, like Mele’s. By the same token, human
prejudices, partialities, wishful thinking and precipitate cases of believing
will largely overlap with self-deception, while there are reasons for a
similar overlap not to occur and for keeping the phenomena distinct.
Let me then introduce the case through the following scenario, drawn
from Scott-Kakures,59 which contains the first of the four critical points
55 Ivi, p. 282.
56 Ivi, p. 283.
57 Ivi, p. 287.
58 M. Johnston, Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind, cit., p. 65, emphasis by the
author.
59 D. Scott-Kakures, At ‘Permanent Risk’: Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-
Deception, cit., pp. 578-579.
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I advance against strong anti-intentionalism. They all have been previously
mentioned (section 2, p. 155-56): the need of differentiating between
human and animal biased cognition on the one hand, and specifically
human self-deception on the other; the need of differentiating between
wishful thinking and self-deception; the need of differentiating between
precipitated cases of believing and self-deception; the need of doing
justice to the active role of the self-deceiver in accomplishing self-
deception, even once we reject the traditionalist intentionalist picture.
1) Why an animal cannot be a self-deceiver.
Scott-Kakures presents the following case in order to test Mele’s
deflationism about self-deception. Consider Bonnie, the cat.
Like most felines, Bonnie can make fine aural discriminations. She can, for
example, distinguish the sound of the removal of her own medication from the
cupboard from the sounds of the removal of other objects – she promptly
disappears only when her own medication is removed. Bonnie is also exceedingly
fond of her food. She is apt to scamper into the kitchen when she hears a can of
her food being opened. She rarely so scampers into the kitchen when some
non-cat-food item is being opened.60
Yet, on occasions upon which Bonnie is very hungry she mistakes
non-cat-food sounds for cat-food sounds, whilst in the absence of hunger
she doesn’t make such mistake. We may assume that Bonnie enjoys some
form of belief-like and desire-like states, although it is reasonable to sup-
pose – and indeed this is the point on which Scott-Kakures makes his
argument trades - that these very states are different in kind from humans’.
We may describe the situation Bonnie is in so: «When Bonnie is under
the influence of a strong desire for food, she is apt to come to believe
falsely that the cat food is currently being opened in the kitchen»61. Should
we say that Bonnie is self-deceived? On Scott-Kakures’ opinion, a
deflationist like Mele has scant basis to deny such a characterization.
Recall Mele’s (a)-(d) conditions: firstly, Bonnie’s belief is false (a); secondly,
the desire is a non-deviant cause of the belief reached (c); thirdly, the
data she possesses are treated in a motivationally biased way (b), and
even though we might grant that she does not treat data in the agential
manner a human being treats factual judgments and normative epistemic
principles, she is nonetheless an information processor, whose operation
is affected by a desire in the present case. Furthermore, it is in the very
60 Id., p. 578.
61 Ivi, p. 579. For another explanatory hypothesis on the case, see Charles Young’s
suggestion, reported in ibidem, footnote 7.
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nature of a bias to get executed beyond any agential control over its
activation. Sometimes we cannot avoid being biased, as it is shown in the
literature about cognition and cognitive unconscious, although we can
get trained not to persevere on keeping the bias up once trained to detect
it as such. That this can be so for humans renders even more intelligible
the case for animals, which certainly do not enjoy our conceptual
sophistication over their mind.
That condition (d) is not relevant to exclude Bonnie’s being self-
deceived is granted by the fact that (d) is not necessary to self-deception:
the fact that the self-deceiver recognizes the strength of the unfavourable
evidence at his disposal and that, on that basis, he goes on testing the
favoured hypothesis through methods which do not meet his best
epistemic judgement may be sufficient to self-deception, but not
indispensable, on Mele’s view. Notice that in self-deception embarking
on the hypothesis testing process makes sense only if we assume that the
self-deceiver recognizes that some feared ‘propositions’ are more likely
true than false. Were not the proposition feared and were not the evidence
recognized as appropriate to conclude as to its truth value, the self-
deceptive process would presumably not get started. Bonnie cannot
certainly undertake any such process: she doesn’t possess the conceptual
complexity necessary for second-order beliefs and reflection upon her
doxastic condition which (d) points to. This is in fact what sanctions the
difference in kind between humans and animal doxastic and psychological
life.62 In any case, I do not want to exclude that frequently we reach
doxastic conclusions without employing much sophisticated strategies.
The all point I need to make is to contend through the fours argument I
have been giving for these phenomena deserving the name of self-
deception.
In sum, however counterintuitive it may appear, if (d) is not assumed
as necessary, nothing prevents, on the deflationary model, to include
Bonnie among the paradigmatic examples of self-deception. By the same
token, human self-deception itself risks to fade into wishful thinking, as
I will say in the following set of considerations.
2) Why self-deception is not akin to wishful thinking.
It isn’t immediately clear whether or not wishful thinking should be
taken as relevantly similar to wishful believing, but we can certainly consider
as empirically real cases where a person’s indulging in wishful thoughts,
62 Clearly, we are to suppose that the first-order beliefs of animals are different in
kind from human ones in the first place, if anything because animals lack language and it
is extremely hard to say that they make factual judgements relevantly similar to ours.
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her entertaining desirable fantasies which express her own wishes, fears,
emotions and the like can influence her behaviour as much as beliefs do.
This is the claim Lazar puts forward63 when explaining how self-deceptive
beliefs are a kind of fantasy and how self-deception should be best viewed
as a kind of wishful thinking gone wrong. The phenomenon is irrational:
the believer should conduct herself better than she does, by avoiding
assuming her fantasies as evidence of her enjoying certain desirable features,
or people being as she can’t help seeing them to be, or certain state of
affairs being undisputable facts. It is clearly also motivated. While wishful
thinking in itself cannot necessarily be irrational (there is nothing
immediately irrational in fantasying as such), wishful believing is more
clearly on the irrational side. Crucially, however, human full-blown self-
deception operates in the face of contrary evidence at the believer’s disposal.
On the contrary, wishful believing can entirely be accomplished without
any unfavourable evidence in place and so without any epistemic work on
the part of the believer. Suppose I believe in God since I was a child. I
have always thought of God. The thought that God exists is wishful for
me and I have never displayed any interest in determining whether or not
God exist. I obviously lack any conclusive evidence over God’s existence,
but I do not care at all about the evidence. I can even feel no need to give
an answer to the atheist’s challenge: I am completely deaf to his reasons,
maybe I have never been sufficiently closely exposed to his argumentations.
One might say that I believe in God ‘because’ the thought of his existence
is overwhelmingly wishful, but the order of the explanation should be
reversed by my lights: I believe in God through education ‘and’ the thought
is wishful. Do I count as a self-deceiver? Maybe I am merely ‘self-deceived’,
intending with the past participle that I have been ‘misled’ by education
and exposure to a deeply religious social environment. I have acquired a
belief about the proposition that God exists without testing it in any relevant
sense, without ever reasoning on it and without ever striving to prove its
reasonableness. The case will of course be different if, as a faithful, I began
to doubt at some point that God exists and I engaged in a process of
‘interested’ justification of my belief in order to retain it.
A similar point could be made to explain cases of optimism,
pessimism, prejudice of various sorts, non-painful cultivation of self-
image,64 and so on.
63 A. Lazar, Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Belief ‘Under
the Influence’, cit.
64  One beautiful example comes from French literature: the complex cultivations
of beliefs about herself that the main character of Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary
magnificently manages to attain. G. Flaubert, Madame Bovary, Lowell Bair, 1967, trans.
Bantam, New York 1959.
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Wishful and fearful thinking is synonymous of delusion, fantasy, day-
dreaming. If it goes wrong so as to turn into wishful believing and influence
our behaviour, this may be explicated by appealing to partiality: I have
never taken into consideration what I’d better think about the belief that p,
or I have never had any occasion on which my attention has been drawn to
reconsider that maybe it is unreasonable to cultivate a certain prejudice I
have got and which has always directed my related evaluation. In a word, I
have never been called upon taking a second-order stance on my belief that
p. I may well be criticised for not being sufficiently critical or intellectually
alerted, even for being self-‘deceived’,65 but not for being a self-deceiver.
3) Precipitate cases of believing vs. self-deception.
Lazar presents the case of John, a man who lost his job.66 He feels
depressed and at times believes that he will not have any chance to get a
new job. However, after a dinner spent with his best friends, he feels
reassured and he now believes that he indeed has good chances of getting
a new job. Lazar gives the examples as one which would show how
emotions and feelings, along with desires, are normal players in the belief-
formation process and that self-deception doesn’t require more than this
in order to succeed. No doubt the plausibility of similar belief occurrences
should not be played down: we are all acquainted with such doxastic
seesaw when heavily distressed. Emotions largely prevent our doxastic
life from following our best epistemic standards. The point I wish to
stress, again, is whether this suffices to self-deception. Isn’t it more suitably
describable as a case of ‘precipitate believing’? Isn’t the case described
one in which no significantly accurate epistemic work was done in order
to reach the favoured conclusion? The man does not weigh ‘all’ the
evidence at his disposal, maybe after the conversion with his friends he
entirely forgot the negative evidence he attended before meeting them.
Conversely, he had formed the pessimistic belief without thinking at all
of the countervailing considerations coming from the thought that he
has dear friends who trusts on him, despite the recent professional failure.67
65 A proposal for distinguishing between a self-deceiver and a self-deceived is in M.
Forrester, Self-Deception and Valuing Truth, «American Philosophical Quarterly», 39, 1,
2002, p. 40.
66 A. Lazar, Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Belief ‘Under the
Influence’, cit., p.281.
67 Lazar avoid saying what the conversation John has with his friends concerns. Maybe
they directly provide him with new evidence about his chances to get a new job. It remains
clear, however, that even though they do not discuss about John’s unemployment, John
can still use their love and make a number of inference from it, in order to derive the
conclusion that he is not hopeless as a man and, consequently, as a worker.
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His epistemic standards are not operative in their fullest either before or
later. He needn’t work on them in order to back up his desired conclusion.
That emotions, pleasant thoughts, and pleasure in general shape our view
of the world does not entail that we are self-deceiver, although we may
result even badly mistaken when in the grip of them.
4) Self-deception as an active, agential process.
I have argued thus far that the peculiar epistemic activity the self-
deceiver deploys marks the difference between self-deception and the
cases of motivated irrational believing sketched above. In precipitate cases
of believing we assist at a suspension of the normal epistemic standards
of judgments – a suspension we frequently cannot avoid, for instance
when under the influence of a strong emotion. The case of wishful/fearful
thinking equally does not display any significant reasoning activity on
the part of the believer and it is akin to cases of partiality, prejudice, etc.
Such believers are irrational because they make their inference so hastily
and inaccurately, they simply ‘jump to the conclusion’.
The role of reflection upon one’s doxastic predicament and a
laborious epistemic negotiation of a kind to be specified about what we
rationally ought to think of a certain proposition we fears or desires given
the evidence is the mark of self-deception. No such lucid negotiation is
necessary to make sense of the cases of motivated irrationality just seen.
No relevant agential intervention on the part of the believer is required
to shape the direction of their cognition. However irrational their doxastic
behaviour and odd their conclusions may appear, they fail to have the
degree of control over their epistemic strategy the self-deceiver shows to
enjoy.
Before I proceed toward my view, I wish to precise that I am not
contending for the diagnosis of self-deception of any of the cases thus
far quoted in particular, nor do I wish to say that those I presented as
cases more difficultly gatherable among the ones of self-deception must
be not. Self-deception is an interpretative hypothesis over real cases of
false believing and in many circumstances it can be difficult to judge
how the process has been really achieved. Maybe, most of the alleged
cases of self-deception in the literature (as those presented at the
beginning) are best accounted along the lines of precipitate believing. In
general, what I wish to vindicate is the conceptual and empirical possibility
of much more complex, though non paradoxical, cases where the
intention to test the favoured hypothesis shapes cognition through means
of reasoning and full-blown sensitivity to reasons. In a word, where the
believer ‘advocates’ for the desired conclusion as a lawyer would do, and
in a way that at a remarkable degree satisfies the demands of his best
epistemic principles.
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4. How self-deception works: Sartre-beliefs in human affairs.
Self-deception paradigmatically begins from a tendentious ‘practical
question’:68 «What should I think about p?», e.g., «Does my wife really
cheat me?», «Am I really ill?», «Do I really love that man?», «Did I
really hasten my alcoholic husband’s death?». The installation of the
hypothesis p is certainly the expression of the desire that p be true. This
is, I think, a genuine bias the self-deceiver may be not aware of, while the
self-deceiver may even overtly recognize that he wishes that p. That is to
say: he may even conceptualise that he wishes that p, while failing to
recognize that the wish has casually installed p in the guise of a hypothesis
ready to be tested for confirmation (recall the confirmation bias and
how motivation works on it, explained by Mele, see section 3). Our
betrayed husband may say to himself, or to others, spontaneously (as an
answer to a first critical evaluation of his own desire to test p) or when
questioned: «It’s clear that I wish that my wife is faithful. That’s why I
want to be sure that she is!». So, we needn’t suppose the desire to be
unconscious, though operative, for self-deception getting started, whilst
we may reasonably suppose that our mind generates the hypothesis itself
without any control on our part over it and without any awareness that
we are undergoing a similar bias.69
That being correct notwithstanding, we get little advantage in
deflating self-deception up to the point at which it fades into the slumber
of reason. Rationality, and the thirst for it, more than its sleep, generates
self-deception.70 Real and common as they may be, other forms of
motivated irrationality do not resemble the higher-level type of motivated
irrationality that self-deception comprises. Self-deceiver’s conceptual
sophistication is all in the service of the desired conclusion and in the
ideal case of an epistemically and psychologically ‘very’ skilled self-
deceiver who does no fail to realize that at every step of his investigation
over p he needs to justify what he comes to think, successful self-deception
can require time, great reflection and a considerable number of
justificatory stories to pin down the self-deceptive doxastic conclusion.
A chain of supplementary self-deceptive plots may be necessary to back
up the conclusion. Most of them will not concern the status of p given
68 For the distinction between theoretical and practical question, see R. Moran, R.,
Making Up Your Mind: Self-Interpretation and Self-Constitution, «Ratio», (n.s.), 1, 1988,
pp. 135-51.
69  See A. Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked, cit., pp. 30-33.
70 For similar views, compare D. H. Sanford, Self-Deception as Rationalization, cit.;
and T. Penelhum, Pleasure and Falsity, in Philosophy of Mind, ed. by S. Hampshire,
Harper & Row, New York 1966, pp. 78-121.
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the evidence, but the value of the evidence; the reasons why not to seek
new evidence; the reasons why one is sometimes licensed not to apply
his best epistemic standards; the reasons why the situation the self-
deceiver is in can be grouped out among the exceptional cases; and so
on. In a word, self-deception is a vast and intense operation of «inventions
of reasons»,71 which often mobilizes our more sophisticated sensitivity
to what reason demands. Self-deceivers wants their beliefs to be justified
and true. As every reflective believer, they value having true beliefs.72 If
necessary, they may even proceed to undermine and sophisticate the sense
of what it is to have a belief. Sartre’s analysis of «bad faith»73 is focussed
precisely on such a radical, though not uncommon, I think, possibility.
Although the topic would deserve a long, separate discussion, I will try
to summarize what Sartre has in mind and I will restrict the discussion to
the introduction of the ideas that are immediately relevant to the present
purpose.
Owing to the unfortunate circumstances of our lives, we often fail
to be in the enviable position of the perfect knower. ‘Imperfections’ of
belief, in its etymological sense, is a normal predicament for human beings.
Arriving at forming beliefs on a host of subject matter is a project that
often fails, which falls short and is consciously left incomplete. «When
this happens», as Wood has put it in his discussion of Sartre’s bad faith,74
«what we are left with as beliefs are things that are made to do the job of
belief, but which we recognize as insufficient to do this job». Wood
proposes then to interpret Sartre’s suggestion that in bad faith I
paradigmatically believe what I disbelieve in terms of a distinction
between two nuances of the concept of believing: I believe what is self-
evident and undeniable on the basis of the evidence presented to me,
but I recognize that I also believe (Wood calls it «to believe*»)75 on the
basis of inadequate, mixed, or ambiguous evidence. I accept to believe*
at times because, though I lack unequivocal evidence, I still need an
established way of dealing with the world and reacting to it (including
verbal behaviour, tacit speech, explanatory and practically orientating
thoughts). From the standpoint of the project of believing, believing*
results unsatisfactory, but we all are used to live with it.
Now, the skilled self-deceiver can favourably exploits this rift at the
heart of our concept of believing while carrying out his reasoning toward
71 D. H. Sanford, Self-Deception as Rationalization, cit., p. 158.
72 Compare M. Forrester, Self-Deception and Valuing Truth, cit., p. 44.
73  J.-P. Sartre, L’être et le néant, cit., ch. 2.
74 A. W. Wood, Self-Deception and Bad Faith, cit., p. 217.
75 Ivi, pp. 217-8.
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the self-deceptive doxastic outcome. There may be a point at which he
overwhelmingly can’t refrain from recognizing the insufficiency of the
evidence gathered or positively/negatively misinterpreted, the extremely
weak character of his already performed justification not to seek new
one so as to adhere to his best epistemic standards (like the requirements
of total evidence for inductive reasoning). He needs a further justification
as to why what he obtains after having tested his overall hypothesis testing
strategy is ‘actually’ enough doxastically to conclude his reasoning and
come to a halt: this justification lies in the disbelief about believing. He
can end up saying: «No one can completely know everything all the time,
I am aware in advance that I cannot do more than believe* in many cases
and for all I know this may well be one of them». I myself recall more
than one time at which I have taken a stance of this sort relatively to
highly thematic questions of my life by their very nature at risk of turning
into self-deception, and I did not always manage to avoid reaching the
false conclusion I later retreated. The reader is invited to try the
experiment with the examples of self-deception previously given: the
betrayed husband, the ill oncologist, the affectionate mother, the girl in
love, etc. If they are not cases of precipitate believing, tropism-like
jumping to hasty conclusions, ingenuity or ignorance cases, they all can
be intelligibly enriched so as to discover in the self-deceivers’ train of
thoughts similar epistemic considerations. I do not claim that they all
‘have to’ be so construed. I simply claim that they can.
5. What I do not know of myself qua self-deceiver
 On the view of self-deception I have been presenting, the self-
deceiver does not fail to recognize the he desires that p be true, nor does
he fail to be aware that he is testing p for strengthen the evidence apt to
justify p. He intentionally tests p, though he certainly does not
intentionally test it in order to deceive himself. But then, what does he
fail to realize? Where does his failure of self-knowledge, if any, lie? I
grant him to be rational and epistemically competent, or he would not
have been able to argue so finely for his desired belief, which is arduously
reached and watched over. I also grant that, were it not be for the desire
that p be true, the whole rationalising process would have not taken
place. Something must have escaped his attention, for we are assuming
that it was in principle and in practice possible for him to direct his
cognition differently, toward the correct belief. I think that what escaped
their epistemic control is the connection between the desire and the
process that the former has triggered and sustained. They fail to judge
the correct causal order between their attitudes, so missing the possibility
of refraining from the obstinate search for justifying reasons for the
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improbable proposition p. Self-deceivers noticeably misconceive what
animates their doxastic and cognitive activity. A similar view is worked
out by Annette Barnes:
[…] the self-deceived will always misapprehend, will always not make a high
enough estimate of the degree to which anxious desire that p contributes to the
belief that p. He or she will believe that the belief is justified, that the belief is
based on evidential beliefs or on direct sensory perception to an extent sufficient
for justification.76
Notice the presence in this account of the various second-order
beliefs associated with the epistemic status of the object-level belief, e.g.,
the belief that the belief that p is justified or that it is sufficiently grounded
in evidence. In a word, the kind of beliefs their epistemic manoeuvre at
every step requires in order to be carried out so as to result satisfactory
to a rational creature. Scott-Kakures writes:
Like any reflective reasoner, [the self-deceiver] will regard her investigation
as directed by herself, by her grasp upon what reason recommends; her search
is a search for reasons that will permit her to bring satisfactory closure to her
investigations. Yet, quite independently of her own evaluations, judgments, and
activities her investigations are directionally driven by desire and interest.77
Since the self-deceiver then exerts meta-cognitive control over the
process responsible for the installation of the belief, minimal
intentionalism is right: self-deception demands that there be an agent.
At the same time, deflationists are right at claiming that self-deception is
not intentional in the way described by the dynamic paradox, and that it
is not a process at the outer limit of our understanding.
6. Failure of self-knowledge and blame in self-deception
We may wonder why a self-deceiver fails to judge the process he
undertakes as highly suspicious. After all, not every believer in the grip of
a desire that p be true ends up believing a falsity. Not only doesn’t the
desire in itself suffice to trigger self-deception - this is what Bermúdez
objects to Mele, by advancing a «problem of selectivity»78 for self-deception
76 A. Barnes, Seeing Through Self-Deception, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
1997, p. 102.
77 D. Scott-Kakures, At ‘Permanent Risk’: Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-
Deception, cit., p 599.
78 J. L. Bermúdez, Self-Deception, Intentions and Contradictory Beliefs, «Analysis»,
60, 2000, pp. 309-19.
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that deflationism does not accommodate: many people refrain from similar
search for reasons in the service of a desired conclusion; but it is also in
many cases correctly judged as being the possible cause of self-deceptive
temptations. I think that we cannot reasonably expect people to be
invariantly able to reach such a refined, self-critical psychological judgment
over themselves and their cognitive styles. Although their thirst for
rationality is not suspended in self-deception, as it is in wishful thinking or
other immediate forms of motivated irrational believing, and although they
show to be clever reasoners, the bootstrapping of the self which would be
necessary to avoid self-deception might still not be available to them. We
have here an elucidation of the problem of selectivity: selective is one’s
personality and the counterfactual circumstances that help shape one’s
disposition to self-deception. If A desire that p, B desire that p, and A goes
on deceiving himself, while B does not, their psychological situations were
presumably different from the beginning. The desire that p be true does
not suffice to trigger self-deception, unless others features, concerning the
cognitive style of the person as a whole, are operative. Contrary to Mele,
desire is necessary to self-deception, though not sufficient.
It is worth noticing that Forrester makes a list of epistemic virtues, as
it happens, that can help overcome or avoid self-deception: firstly, a self-
deceiver
must believe that knowing the truth – in his situation and in general – will lead to
his greatest overall satisfaction, and he must have some desire to know the truth.
Secondly, he must be able to recognize self-deceptive tendencies – signalled primarily
by his realization that […] he suspects that p might be true […]. Apart from seeing
self-deception in himself, he surely knows that in general people tend to believe
what they want to believe and thus could be alert for this trait in himself. Finally, he
must manipulate his motivation so as to diminish his desire to avoid the truth.79
That one lacks the virtues in question or the fact that one may well
not be sufficiently acquainted with human psychology, seems not to
constitute a condition accountable in any relevant sense so as to license a
correct application of blame to self-deceivers’ cases. We can’t possibly
expect people to be so skilled to take a second-order stance over their
cognitive strategy of the sorts Forrester describes – or self-deception
would never occur. Still, interpreters’ dissatisfaction has a ground. The
believers’ commitment to truth makes for the difference. It is in his
motivational set80 to reach a reasonable conclusion: he wants his beliefs
79 M. Forrester, Self-Deception and Valuing Truth, cit., p. 42
80 A useful discussion on internal reasons and blame is in B. Williams, Internal Reasons
and the Obscurity of Blame, in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers,
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to be rationally justifiable and he does not intend to believe what is false
or unjustifiable. He wants to find explanations that will preserve the
beliefs he favour, but he never fails to have the information at hand to
realize that «his evasive activities could lead to his denial of the truth».81
The problem is that even once a proposition can look reasonable, we are
in a position to choose whether to believe, disbelieve, or suspend
judgement. ‘Given the fact that’ the self-deceiver never ceases to suspect
that p might be false, it is rational from his own standpoint at least not to
form a belief and suspending the judgment. ‘The formation of a belief
under uncertain condition is never rational’. Other attitudes are
recommended, such as doubting. Furthermore, that beliefs* are
sometimes formed under uncertainty does not entail that this is all the
believing we live with. In particular, the subject matter of many cases of
self-deception are highly verifiable through direct evidential proof (a
cancer can be clinically tested, an unfaithful wife can be unmasked, and
so on).
What we blame, I think, in our and others’ self-deception is that it is
in principle among the self-deceiver’s capacities, qua rational agent, to
compare his current method of dealing with evidence to his usual
standards. This is the clue that normally alerts a self-deceiver to reconsider
his psychological predicament and that normally rescues him from self-
deception. On that occasion, he normally also realizes that the desire
that p shaped his cognition in the way it did, and he gets an insight into
the correct causal connection between his attitudes. So, the self-deceiver
had many internal reasons not to end up forming a belief that it turns
out to be false, in the first place, given the persistence of the suspect;
and, secondly, the more he shows to be skilled in defending his
propositions and evaluating his method of evaluation as exceptionally
licensable given the circumstances, as described in section 4 and 5, the
more we would want to expect him to have at least suspended the
judgment, and taken one last, meta-cognitive stance about the suspicion
that such an ad hoc epistemic evaluation gives rise to.
7. Conclusion.
I have argued that self-deception involves an intense rational activity
and that it does not consist of a mere, immediate suspension of normal
epistemic standards of a believer. I have also claimed that, although strong
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, pp. 35-56. See also M. S. Brady, Valuing,
Desiring and Normative Priority, «Philosophical Quarterly», 53, 211, 2004, pp. 231-242.
81 M. Forrester, Self-Deception and Valuing Truth, cit., p. 42.
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intentionalism fails to give an unproblematic account of self-deception,
and that deflationists tend to make self-deception appear in the guise of
other, distinguishable forms of motivated irrationality, a weak intentionalism
such as that defended in this essay can more plausibly account for self-
deception. It fares better if coupled with some of the deflationist intuitions,
e.g., that the agent fails to make an appropriate judgments over the causal
drive of his epistemic behaviour.
I have also argued that blame applied to self-deception is grounded
on the self-deceivers’ capacities qua reasoners interested in truth, as they
intend themselves to be. I think a consequence of my account is that self-
deception shows that the purpose of searching for truth is not enough in
itself to guarantee that our search will actually lead us to truth. Impartiality
seems then to be the crucial ingredient to gain truth, or at least to prevent
us from straight believing a falsity, by recommending to us judgement-
suspension where a suspect persists.82
82 This essay draws from researches begun in 2002 at the University of Florence on
the occasion of my first degree dissertation and carried out at the University of Stirling
(Scotland) during two semesters in 2004-2005. Special thanks to my supervisor Professor
Alan Millar and Professor. Duncan H. Pritchard for the bursary conceded as a full-time
postgraduate student of the M.Litt. on «Knowledge & Mind» and for their unceasing
help. I am grateful to Dr. Mike Wheeler (University of Stirling), Dr. Adrian Haddock
(University of Stirling) and Dr. Peter Baumann (University of Aberdeen) for their
comments on the manuscript. Thanks also to the University of Florence for the Ph.D.
studentship previously granted and for the permission to spend one year at the University
of Stirling. I am particularly in debt with Professor Alessandro Pagnini, his long-term
studies in this area, his encouragement and supervision.
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